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According to Sider’s (2001; 2003) Lewisian argument (Lewis 1986; 1991) 
against vague existence, if the linguistic theory of vagueness is assumed, 
existence cannot be vague, since the very idea of multiple precisifications for 
our most unrestricted quantifier appears to lead to a contradiction. Torza 
(2017) accepts the latter point but replies that we can conclude from it that 
‘existence’1 in the object-language is not vague, only if we assume that 
‘existence’ in the meta-language is precise. By the same token, he also 
accepts that the idea that ‘existence’ in the meta-language is vague leads to a 
contradiction, but again points out that we can then infer that ‘existence’ in 
the meta-language is not vague, only if we assume that ‘existence’ in the 
meta-meta-language is precise. The same kind of reasoning can be repeated 
at every order. The upshot, Torza concludes, is that Sider’s argument appears 
to be insufficient to rule out the possibility of what he calls ‘super-vague 
existence’, that is, the idea that ‘what precisifications there are is vague at all 
orders’ (Torza 2017: section 1.2). 
The aim of this paper is to argue that the possibility of super-vague 
existence is ineffective against the conclusion of Sider’s argument, as super-
vague existence cannot be consistently claimed to be a kind of linguistic 
vagueness. As I will suggest, Torza’s idea of super-vague existence seems to 
be better suited to model vague existence under the assumption that there is 
some form of worldly indeterminacy in existence, contra what Lewis (1986; 
1991) and Sider (2001; 2003) assume. 
 
                                                     
1 For simplicity’s sake I will speak of the vagueness of ‘existence’ (understood as our most 
unrestricted notion of existence) instead of the vagueness of our most unrestricted quantifier. 
Nothing of substance hangs on this. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION: VAGUE EXISTENCE AND SEMANTIC 
INDECISION 
Suppose a and b are clear, determinate instances of bald men, and yet it is 
indeterminate whether there is someone different from a and b that is also 
bald. For simplicity’s sake, let’s also assume that it is determinately the case 
that there aren’t more than three bald men in the world. According to the 
linguistic theory of vagueness Lewis (1986; 1991) and Sider (2001; 2003) 
assume, indeterminacy in baldness consists in a kind of semantic indecision 
involving the predicate ‘bald’. In turn, this kind of semantic indecision 
consists in the fact that there are multiple precisifications for ‘bald’ assigning 
to it different extensions. Therefore, if ‘bald’ is vague, there must be at least 
two different sets of entities corresponding to two different precisifications of 
‘bald’. In our case, these two sets could be {a,b} and {a,b,c}. Since a and b 
are members of both sets, they are definite cases of baldness. c, on the other 
hand, is only a member of {a,b,c}, and thus it’s only a borderline, or 
indeterminate instance of baldness. 
A perhaps more perspicuous way to express this idea is to think of 
precisifications of ‘bald’ as ways of specifying which entities fall in its 
extension. Suppose, for instance, that the following is a faithful representation 
of all the existing entities: 
[a, b, c] 
Our two precisifications could then be represented as follows:  
(P1)  [a, b, c]  
(P2) [a, b, c] 
P1 represents only a and b as being bald, whereas P2 represents also c as 
being bald. However, P1 and P2 don’t disagree as to what entities exist. They 
only differ in the way they catalogue entities with respect to the predicate 
‘bald’, so to say. In other words, precisifications concern only the relation 
between language and world and not the world itself, as it were. 
Suppose now that ‘existence’—the expression standing for our most 
unrestricted notion of existence—is a vague expression. This means that there 
are multiple precisifications for ‘existence’. Therefore, supposing that it is 
determinately the case that a and b exist and that there aren’t more than three 
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entities in the world, we might have in this case two2 precisifications that look 
precisely like P1 and P2 with the only difference being that the bold letters 
mark existing entities instead of bald ones. As before, precisifications don’t 
disagree as to what exists, but only as to which entities are instances of the 
relevant expression. However, in this case the relevant expression is 
‘existence’, that is, the expression standing for our most unrestricted notion 
of existence. P1 represents ‘existence’ as applying only to a and b, and not to 
c. c, however, is an existing entity. We have, thus, that there is something such 
that, according to P1, isn’t in the extension of ‘existence’. Therefore, either 
P1 isn’t an admissible precisification of ‘existence’ or ‘existence’ isn’t our 
most unrestricted notion of existence. Either way, we have reached a 
contradiction.  
2.  SUPER-VAGUENESS AND MULTIPLE PRECISIFICATIONS: A 
CHALLENGE 
Suppose that Alex and Ted agree both that a and b exist and that there aren’t 
more than three entities in the world. Alex says that it is vague whether there 
is also a third entity beyond a and b. Ted disagrees. However, both Alex and 
Ted take vagueness to be semantic indecision. So, Ted challenges Alex to 
show him what the multiple precisifications for ‘existence’ are. Both agree 
that P1={a,b} is one such precisification3 and that, if there are other 
precisifications, then they must contain both a and b. The problem, as Ted 
points out, is that, if there was a second precisification P2 for ‘existence’ 
containing an entity c different from a and b, then (for the argument just 
reviewed in section 1) either P1 wouldn’t be an admissible precisification of 
‘existence’ or ‘existence’ wouldn’t be the most unrestricted notion of 
existence, contradicting what both he and Alex are assuming. Therefore, Ted 
concludes, Alex cannot provide him with multiple precisifications for 
‘existence’ and thus cannot claim that ‘existence’ is vague. 
Alex may reply that what Ted has shown doesn’t prove that there aren’t 
multiple precisifications. It can only prove that it isn’t true, or definitely the 
                                                     
2 For simplicity’s sake I am assuming here that there aren’t more than two precisifications 
for ‘existence’ and that the following sentence is thus true: ‘If there is some x different from 
a and b then it is determinately the case that if there is some y different from a and b, then y 
is identical to x’. 
3 From now on I will identity precisifications with sets for simplicity’s sake. 
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case, that there are multiple precisifications for ‘existence’. Maybe, continues 
Alex, it is vague what precisifications for ‘existence’ there are. In other 
words, says Alex, all we have said so far is compatible with ‘existence’ being 
second-order vague. 
However, the same problem we encountered for the alleged first-order 
vagueness of ‘existence’ also arises for its second-order vagueness and the 
indeterminacy concerning its precisifications. In fact, both Alex and Ted will 
agree that there is one precisification2 for ‘existence2’ having {a,b} as a 
member.4 However, Alex cannot say that there is a second precisification2 for 
‘existence2’ having {a,b,c} as a member, because that would entail that c 
exists3, and thus it determinately exists2, contradicting his main assumption. 
The point generalizes. No matter how high in the hierarchy Alex retracts 
in order to fend off the objection and avoid the reductio, at every higher-level 
n he cannot consistently affirm that there aren multiple precisificationsn-1 for 
‘existencen-1’. At every meta-level n he can only point to a single 
precisificationn-1 for ‘existencen-1’and then retreat to the next level.  
It seems thus that there is a clear sense in which Alex cannot meet Ted’s 
challenge, since at no level n can he consistently point to multiple 
precisificationsn-1 for ‘existencen-1’.  
3. IS SUPER-VAGUENESS VAGUENESS? 
Torza’s (2017) ‘super-vagueness’ is the idea that although, for any level n, a 
contradiction ensues, if ‘existencen’ is assumed to be vague, for no level n can 
it be concluded that ‘existencen’ isn’t vague, unless it is assumed that the 
meta-language Ln+1 is precise. The fact that Alex doesn’t seem in position to 
meet Ted’s challenge doesn’t prove that Torza’s idea of ‘super-vagueness’ is 
incoherent. However, Alex’s infinite retreat to higher and higher meta-
                                                     
4 The object language here is what previously was the meta-language. Accordingly, what 
‘precisification’ means here is not what it meant before. For every order n (where the initial 
object language has order 1, the meta-language has order 2, the meta-meta-language has order 
3, etc.) I will use ‘precisificationn’ and ‘‘existencen’’ to refer to precisifications of the nth-
order (meta)-language and the expression in the n+1th-order meta-language naming the nth-
order notion of existence. Correspondingly, ‘existencen’ stands for the nth-order notion of 
existence. Therefore, at every order n, vagueness in the n-1th-order notion of existence is 
expressed by the sentence ‘there aren multiple precisificationsn-1 for ‘existencen-1’’). I will 
omit subscripts when the context makes it clear which notions are in play. 
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languages appears to clearly undermine the effectiveness of Torza’s point 
against the conclusion of Sider’s argument.  
Torza claims that Sider’s argument is insufficient to rule out the 
possibility of super-vague existence. However, Sider’s conclusion is that 
existence isn’t vague. Therefore, the claim that there is super-vagueness in 
existence can be problematic for Sider only if it could be shown that super-
vagueness is aptly named, and so that it is indeed a case of vagueness. This, 
however, is precisely what Torza cannot consistently assert. In fact, under the 
assumption that vagueness is just semantic indecision, to say that super-
vagueness is a form of vagueness is equivalent to saying that super-vagueness 
itself is a form of semantic indecision, and thus that there are multiple 
precisifications (somehow) disagreeing about what should be classified as 
existing. However, this is precisely what Sider’s argument (which Torza 
accepts, minus the final reductio) proves to lead to a contradiction. Therefore, 
if the linguistic theory of vagueness is assumed, super-vague existence cannot 
be consistently claimed to be a kind of vagueness in existence. 
Torza’s main point appears to be that Sider’s argument cannot prove that 
there is no existential vagueness because it cannot rule out the possibility of 
super-vague existence. In other words: since the possibility of super-vague 
existence isn’t excluded by Sider’s argument, we cannot conclude that there 
is no kind vagueness in reality, or so Torza’s train of thought seems to go. 
Therefore, Torza can be right only if super-vague existence is indeed a form 
of vagueness in existence. If the only scenarios that aren’t weeded out by 
Sider’s argument are scenarios in which there is no vagueness in what there 
is, in what sense should the possibility of these scenarios be taken to be 
problematic for its conclusion?  
Torza seems to be right that Sider’s argument cannot prove ‘there is no 
existential vagueness’ to be true.5 However, not only can super-vagueness not 
be asserted to be a kind of vagueness, but—for this very reason—neither can 
it be claimed to be problematic for the conclusion of Sider’s original 
                                                     
5 At least, we might add, until no suitable rule of reductio is provided. Notice that it would 
suffice to assume the validity of the following rule of minimal reductio in order to contrast 
to contrast the object-language counterpart of Torza’s argument (‘∆𝑛’ stands for n iterations 
of the determinacy operator ‘∆’): 
(Minimal Reductio)  If, for every n: Σ, ~∆𝑛~𝑝 ⊢ ⊥,  then: Σ ⊢ ~𝑝 
Alas, a defence of Minimal Reductio and a full development of this idea are beyond the topic 
of this note and must thus be left for another occasion. 
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argument. Therefore, it seems that what Sider’s argument can indeed prove 
is that, although the linguistic theory of vagueness is compatible with super-
vague existence, super-vague existence cannot be consistently claimed to 
represent (or even possibly represent)6 a counter-example to the thesis that 
there is no existential vagueness.  
Although this result is certainly weaker than Sider’s, it appears to be 
more than enough to tilt the scale in favour of the idea that vague existence is 
impossible under a linguistic theory of vagueness. 
4. A SUPER-META-LANGUAGE FOR SUPER-VAGUE EXISTENCE? 
In the appendix B.7 of his paper, Torza (2017) provides us with a model for 
super-vague existence. Its domain is given by the set {a,b}. As it is clear by 
how the function Dom assigns a domain to each ‘point’ in the model, b is the 
entity that is supposed to merely super-vaguely exist. In fact, although Dom 
assigns to every point a domain featuring a among its members, it only 
assigns {a} to some points, so that according to them a is the only existing 
entity. Here points are supposed to represent precisifications. Therefore, in 
Torza’s model there is an entity b such that there are some precisifications of 
our most unrestricted quantifier ‘∃’ according to which it doesn’t exist. But 
this seems to be precisely the situation from which Sider derives a 
contradiction in his argument. So, if Torza agrees with Sider’s meta-linguistic 
argument that the idea of multiple precisifications for ‘existence’ entails a 
contradiction, why doesn’t he also take a contradiction to follow from his own 
model of appendix B.7? 
In the same way, recall that Torza advertises the idea of super-vagueness 
as the idea that  
(T1) ‘What precisifications there are is vague at all orders’ (Torza 
2017: 210). 
                                                     
6 Notice that Torza cannot even assert, for any n, that it is nth-order vague whether super-
vagueness is semantic indecision. In fact, at every order n, if it were true in Ln that ‘‘super-
vagueness is a form of vagueness’ is vague’, then it would be true in Ln that there is some 
precisification according to which ‘super-vagueness is a form of vagueness’ is true, which, 
however, would entail that there are multiple precisifications for ‘existence’ and thus that 
super-vagueness isn’t a form of vagueness. In other words, letting ‘possibly’ stand for ‘it is 
not the case that it is determinately not the case that’, Torza cannot even claim, for any n, 
that super-vagueness is possibly1, possibly2, possibly3, . . . possiblyn, a form of vagueness.  
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However, as we have seen, in no meta-language Ln it can be claimed that 
(T2) What precisificationsn-1 there aren is vague. 
In every meta-language Ln, (T1) (which speaks of precisifications at every 
order) appears to imply (T2) (which speaks only of the precisifications of Ln). 
How then, can Torza take himself to be in position to assert (T1), if (T2) 
cannot be asserted in any meta-language pertaining to the infinitely ascending 
hierarchy of meta-languages of L?  
A possible answer to these questions is that Torza seems to think that the 
reduction of the ‘hierarchy of metalanguage truth/falsity/vagueness 
predicates to the object language L’ (Torza 2017: 210) he operates in the paper 
can create as a result a sort of ‘super-meta-language’ (as we might call it) that, 
by not belonging to the hierarchy of meta-languages of L, is immune from 
Sider’s objection and thus a safe vantage point from which to consistently 
utter sentences like (T1) and to consistently point to entities that merely super-
vaguely exist (like b in the model of appendix B.7). 
It should be clear, however, that there appears to be no principled reason 
to think that Sider’s argument doesn’t also apply to Torza’s super-meta-
language. In fact, what follows also appears to be true in Torza’s super-meta-
language:  
‘(i) every possible precisification (at any order) of ‘∃’ specifies a 
subset of {a,b} as its domain;  
(ii) therefore, both a and b exist;  
(iii) {a} is the domain of some precisifications; 
(iv) therefore, either ‘∃’ isn’t our most unrestricted quantifier, or those 
precisification according to which {a} is the domain of ‘∃’ aren’t 
admissible precisifications, contrary to what we are assuming;  
(v) either way, we have a contradiction’. 
Once again, this doesn’t in itself prove that ‘∃’ isn’t vague (unless an 
appropriate valid reductio rule is provided). However, it appears to show that 
super-vague existence is actually impossible to model, since the very 
specification of a domain for the model would immediately give away the 




5. SUPER-VAGUE EXISTENCE AND WORLDLY INDETERMINACY 
So far, the possibility of super-vague existence has been discussed only from 
the point of view of theories that take (i) vagueness to be a form of 
indeterminacy concerning precisifications—or ‘p-indeterminacy’, as we 
might call it—and (ii) p-indeterminacy to be semantic indecision. 
Interestingly, however, there seem to be at least two ways to show how super-
vagueness can be consistently said to be a form of p-indeterminacy under the 
assumption that vague existence is instead an ontic form of metaphysical 
indeterminacy ‘in reality’, contra what Lewis (1986; 1991) and Sider (2001; 
2003) assume. 
Suppose that there is indeed a vague, indeterminate, and yet worldly form 
of existence in reality. Let’s call it ‘fuzzy-existence’ and suppose that c 
(merely) fuzzy-exists. Suppose, furthermore, that one tried to explain the 
vagueness of ‘existence’ as p-indeterminacy between the precisifications 
{a,b} and {a,b,c}. Since c fuzzy-exists, every set that has c in its transitive 
closure will most plausibly fuzzy-exist as well.7 In this case, it is then 
incorrect to say, for instance, that there exist (simpliciter) two precisifications 
for ‘existence’, as {a,b,c} merely fuzzy-exists. Therefore, ‘there exists 
something different from a and b’ isn’t true, otherwise it would follow that 
{a,b,c} exists and not merely fuzzy-exists, contrary to what we are assuming. 
However, ‘there exists something different from a and b’ is also not false. In 
fact, if ‘there exists something different from a and b’ were false, then 
‘nothing is different from a and b’ would be true, and so true according to 
every precisification, which would entail that c doesn’t even fuzzy-exists, 
contrary to what we are assuming. The situation clearly generalizes, as every 
candidate precisification having c in its transitive closure will only fuzzy-
exists. Therefore, at any meta-linguistic level n ‘there exists something 
different from a and b’ would, in this case, be neither true nor false. Therefore, 
although in this case it cannot be said that it is vague whether something 
beyond a and b exists, it can be both said that it is super-vague and that this 
case of super-vague existence is indeed a form of p-indeterminacy (at every 
order, between an existing set and a fuzzy-existing one).  
                                                     
7 If, as it is widely assumed in the literature, sets depend on their members for their existence, 
then it appears plausible to suppose (at least in the case at hand) that they ‘inherit’ their ‘mode 
of existence’ at least in the following way: if a set S has only existing members, then S exists; 
if, instead, S has only fuzzy-existing members or both existing and fuzzy-existing members 
(as in the case of {a,b,c}), then S merely fuzzy-exists.  
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The second way in which it seems it could be consistently claimed that 
super-vague existence is a form of p-indeterminacy is by embracing a theory 
of metaphysical indeterminacy along the lines of the one advocated by 
Williams (2008), Barnes (2010; 2013), and Barnes and Williams (2011).8 
Within such a theory, there can be metaphysical indeterminacy when it is 
indeterminate which world, among a set of ‘precisificationally possible’ 
(ersatz) worlds, is actualized (equivalently, when there is more than one ‘p-
possible’ world that ‘does not determinately misrepresent reality’).9 If that is 
indeed the case, then it appears to be possible for there to be two p-possible 
worlds w1 and w2 such that w1 represents c as existing, while w2 doesn’t.10 In 
this case, it is clearly indeterminate whether ‘c’ has a referent (as ‘c’ has a 
referent according to w1, but not according to w2).
11 However (as it appears 
indeed highly plausible), if it is indeterminate whether ‘c’ has a referent, it 
must be also indeterminate whether ‘{a,b,c}’ has a referent. The same clearly 
goes for ‘{{a,b,c},{a,b}}’, ‘{{{a,b,c},{a,b}},{{a,b}}}’, and every term 
attempting to refer to a set having the referent of ‘c’ in its transitive closure. 
It seems, therefore, that if there is indeterminacy as to whether ‘c’ has a 
referent, then not only it is eo ipso indeterminate whether there are multiple 
precisifications for ‘existence’, but, for every meta-linguistic level n, it is also 
indeterminate whether there are multiple precificationsn for ‘existencen-1’, 
which is just equivalent to saying that existence is super-vague.  
Both in the ‘fuzzy-existence’ case and in the case of Barnes and 
Williams’s kind of theory, it appears thus to be possible to assert that super-
vague existence is a form of p-indeterminacy (between existing and fuzzy-
existing sets, in one case, and between different p-possible worlds, in the 
other). However, in both cases, this is something that can be consistently 
claimed only because, at the bottom, the super-vagueness of ‘existence’ isn’t 
grounded in merely semantic facts, but crucially depends on some instance of 
the kind of vagueness ‘in the world’ that Lewis (1986; 1991) and Sider (2001; 
2003) assume to be false. 
                                                     
8 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
9 Barnes and Williams (2011: 115). 
10 Notice that ‘representing c as existing’ must here be understood in a way that doesn’t entail 
c’s existence, otherwise Sider’s argument would appear to go through. See Woodward (2011) 
and Barnes (2013) for possible ways to avoid Sider’s objection in this case. 
11 Notice that, in this case, ‘c exists’ is true only with respect to w1, but false with respect to 
w2. Therefore, although it is determinately either true or false, it is neither determinately true, 




Torza’s (2017) ‘super-vague’ existence is an interesting notion that may help 
us understand the indeterminacy of ‘existence’ under the assumption that, 
pace Lewis (1986; 1991) and Sider (2001; 2003), there is some worldly form 
of metaphysical indeterminacy in reality. However, if what has been said in 
this paper is correct, the idea of super-vague existence appears to be 
ultimately ineffective against the conclusion of Sider’s argument, if the 
linguistic theory of vagueness is assumed.12 
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